1953]

RECENT CASES
AdmiraltyMARITIME LAW APPLIED IN DIVERSITY SUITS IN
FEDERAL LAW COURTS
In two recent maritime tort suits brought on the law side of federal
district courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to recover for injuries
sustained on state territorial waters, it was held on appeal, contrary to an
early Supreme Court view, that the state contributory negligence rules,
which would have barred recovery, were not to be applied.' Instead, both
courts rejected the applicability of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 2 and ruled that
the suits were governed by the general maritime law under which contributory negligence merely diminishes the damages recoverable. Hawn v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc., 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952) and W. E. Hedger
Tranmp. Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 198 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3155 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1952).3
The general maritime law, developed in early maritime codes and in
the customs and practices generally observed in maritime countries, had
been a long recognized branch of the law of nations before the formation
of the United States and had been administered as such by the British viceadmiralty courts in the colonies. 4 It was against this background, joined
with the consideration that contact of the new United States with foreigners would most frequently arise with regard to maritime matters, that
the federal judicial power was extended in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." This ad1. In Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893), a maritime collision case, the Court,
relying on dictum in Atlee v. Northwestern Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389 (U.S. 1874),
declared that although the rule in admiralty requires an equal division of damages
in cases of mutual fault, the rule at law is different and requires a complete denial
of recovery. In a later case, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack, 317 U.S. 239, 245
(1942), the Court, in rejecting the application of a common law rule to a maritime
suit brought in a state court, stated that "Belden v. Chase . . . an 1893 decision
which respondent relies upon as establishing a contrary rule, has never been thus
considered in any of the later cases . . ."
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Although the Third Circuit did not mention Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins in its opinion, it had been argued by the appellant and its rejection
was implicit in the decision. See Brief for Appellant, p. 23 et seq., and Petition
for Rehearing, p. 1 et seq. The Second Circuit expressly held the Erie case to be

inapplicable.
3. The Hawn case was an action for personal
boat charterer of the ship on which the plaintiff
carpenter for a shipfitting concern. In Hedger,
plaintiff's barge resulting from negligent loading
4. For a discussion of the maritime law as

injuries brought against the barewas injured while working as a
suit was brought for damage to
by defendant's stevedores.
a branch of the law of nations

and of the background of the federal admiralty jurisdiction in -the U.S. CNSTi.UTION, see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. oF PA. L. REv. 26 (1952). See also, RoBinsoN, ADnriA'ry

§1 (1939).
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miralty grant of the Judiciary Article did not merely give federal admiralty
courts power to entertain maritime causes; it determined the substantive
law that was to govern, for the clause has been interpreted as adopting the
general maritime law as part of our national law 5 to be applied to cases
arising within admiralty jurisdiction. 6
But confusion has persisted as to the law governing maritime cases
brought in forums other than the federal admiralty courts. 7 The Congress
in the Judiciary Act of 1789 while vesting the admiralty courts with "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," granted law courts-state courts or the law side of the federal courts where the federal jurisdictional requirements are met s-a concurrent jurisdiction under the "saving clause" by "saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." 9 The phrase "common law remedy" means no more
than that law courts can entertain maritime suits which seek a judgment
in personam as distinguished from the proceeding in rem allowed in
admiralty. 10 Yet this grant of concurrent jurisdiction has given rise to the
5. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874). See also, Panama Railroad
Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S.
149 (1920) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
6. In addition, the admiralty grant of Art. III,§ 2 of the U.S. CoNs TrruoN,
coupled with the necessary and proper clause, has been held to be the source of
a federal legislative power over maritime matters. Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375 (1924) ; The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934). For an interesting

discussion of the derivation of the federal maritime legislative power from the admiralty clause in Art. III, § 2 see GooDNow, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CoNsTrroN

151 et seq. (1911) where the author examines the question of a Congressional legislative power derived from other federal jurisdictional grants in the Judiciary Article.
7. On the present question of the applicability of local contributory negligence
rules to maritime tort suits brought on the law side of the federal district courts,
.compare Port of N.Y. Stevedoring Co. v. Castagna, 280 Fed. 618 (2d Cir. 1922)
(state contributory negligence rule rejected), with Johnson v. United States Shipping
Board Emergency F. Corp., 24 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1928) (state rule followed);
Guerrini v. United States, 167 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1948) and In re Pennsylvania
R. Co., 48 F.2d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 1931) (both with dictum to the same effect). As
to suits brought in state courts compare Intagliata v. Shipowners & Meichants
Towboat Co., 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945) and Colonna Shipyard v. Bland,
150 Va. 349, 143 S.E. 729 (1928) (both holding that the admiralty rule must be followed), vith Maleeny v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 237 N.Y. 250, 142 N.E.
602 (1923) and Wilkins v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 20 Wash.2d 422, 147 P.2d
524 (1944) (both holding the common law rule of contributory negligence governs).
8. On the possibility of federal question jurisdiction of maritime claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1950), compare Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir.
1952), with Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1950).
9. 1 STAT. 73, § 9 (1789). The 1948 revision of the Judicial Code changed the
"saving. clause" to read ".

.

. saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to

which they are otherwise entitled." The Reviser's note indicates the change to be
one of phraseology. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 1952).
Suits are brought in law courts under the saving clause to secure the benefits
of a jury trial which is unavailable in the admiralty courts. It was probably concern
about the absence of jury trials in admiralty which lead to the enactment of the
saving clause. See Dickinson, supra note 4, at 49.
10. ROBINsoN, AD MIRALTY 23 (1939). The in rem proceeding appropriates the
shfip herself to the indemnification of the other party and has been held not to be a
common law remedy. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411 (U.S. 1866). But cf.
C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
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notion that when a maritime suit is brought in a state court local rules of
law may be applied, or if suit is brought on the law side of the federal
court, local rules should be applied under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.;1 What this view overlooks is that rights arising within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are federally-created rights to be governed by federal law and that the saving clause did no more than provide forums alternative to the federal admiralty courts for the enforcement
of these rights. The confusion is similar to that which existed under Swift
v. Tyson,12 where federal courts in diversity cases involving state-created
rights were free to disregard local non-statutory law and resolve disputes
under "federal common law." It was this doctrine that Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins rejected when it held that federal courts exercising jurisdiction
in diversity cases must apply both the common and statutory law of the
state in which the cause of action arose. But the Erie doctrine requires
the substantive law of the states to be applied in diversity cases only where
state-created rights are sought to be enforced. Furthermore, one basis for
the Erie decision was that under the Constitution there is no federal common law applicable to causes of action arising within the states; but the
Constitution has been interpreted as providing a "common law"--the
general maritime law-for cases arising within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and it has been long settled that that jurisdiction includes the
navigable waters of the states.' 3 Moreover, to have applied the local contributory negligence rules in the instant cases would have resulted in making maritime tort recovery in many cases dependent on choice of forum,
which was the very situation which Erie sought to correct in overruling
Swift v. Tyson.
The persistence of the argument that law courts may apply local rules
of law to maritime causes has been due in part to the fact that in certain
instances the Supreme Court has recognized a state power to supplement
or modify the general maritime law with regard to conduct occurring on
state territorial waters or by its citizens on the high seas.' 4 Application of
state wrongful death and survival statutes are typical examples. 15 Such
supplementation from local sources is dependent not on whether suit is
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency F. Corp., Maleeny
v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., and Wilkins v. Foss Launch & Tug Co. supra
note 7.

12. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
13. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441 (U.S. 1847); The Propeller Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851).
14. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941)

(state statute providing for survival

of a cause of action against a deceased tort-feasor applied by an admiralty court to
a maritime tort occurring on state territorial waters) and cases cited therein at 388;
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (state wrongful death statute applied by
admiralty court to death on high seas); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S.
1874) (state statute creating liens for repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel in her
home port); The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) and the instances
mentioned therein.
15. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Just v. Chambers, supra.

548

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

brought in an admiralty or law court 16 but on whether the local law sought
to be applied is consistent with the "requirement of uniformity" developed
by the Supreme Court in defining the limits of state law application.
Broadly, the uniformity doctrine prohibits the application of local law where
it conflicts with or works prejudice to the characteristic features of the maritime law.17 The doctrine was implicit in the "adoption of the general maritime law as part of our federal law, for the policy of that body of law is
to protect shipping interests, domestic and foreign, from the diversity of the
laws of the several states.
The operation of local law in the maritime field had been subjected
to the requirement of uniformity in early cases.' Its most significant modern application was in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 9 where the Court
struck down the application of a state workmen's compensation statute to a
longshoreman's maritime injury because to allow the states to subject shipping to their various compensation statutes "would be the destruction of the
very uniformity with respect to maritime matters which the constitution
was designed to establish." 2 In the next uniformity cases before the Court,
Chelentisv. Luckenbach S.S. Co.2 1 and CarlislePacking Co. v. Sandanger,2
seamen attempted to bring actions for negligence against the owners of
the ships on which they were injured, a remedy not then available under the
general maritime law.2 In Chelentis, suit was brought on the law side
of the federal district court, while in Carlisle Packing the action was started
in a state court. In each instance recovery on the grounds of negligence
was denied as conflicting with the rules of the maritime law which, the Court
held, "apply whether the proceeding be instituted in an admiralty or com16. Compare, e.g., Western Fuel v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), with American
Steamboat Co. v. Chace, 16 Wall. 522 (U.S. 1873).
17. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S.
552 (1900); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874) ("One thing, however, is
unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law co-extensive
with and operating uniformly in the whole country." at 575). See generally,
Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HAgv.
L. REv. 246 (1950) and Canfield, The Uniformity of the Maritime Law, 24 MicH.
L. REv. 544 (1926).
18. Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900); The Lottawanna, 21
Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874).
19. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
20. Id. at 217.
21. 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
22. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
23. Prior to the passage of the Seamen's Act of 1920 (Jones Act), "By the
general maritime law . . . a vessel and her owner were liable . . . (for) mainte-

nance and cure whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident, and to
wages at least so long as the voyage continued, and were liable to an indemnity
for injuries received by a seaman in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship
and her appliances; but a seaman was not allowed to recover an indemnity for
injuries sustained through the negligence of the master or any member of the crew."
Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 134 (1928).
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mon law court." 24 More recently, in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack,25 the
Court reversed a state court decision 26 which had applied its local rule as to
burden of proof in a suit brought under the saving clause. Finding the
admiralty rule to be otherwise, the Court held that the plaintiff's right under
the maritime law to be free from the burden of proof imposed by the local
rule "inhered in his cause of action," and could not be prejudiced by local
"procedure." The plaintiffs' right to be free from the bar of the local contributory negligence rules in the instant cases would seem to be well within
this rationale. The local supplementation which has been allowed in the
tort field, such as the application of wrongful death and survival statutes,
has served to fill in "gaps" and to harmonize the maritime law with more
recent tort liability notions, rather than to upset rights in areas where the
maritime law is well defined, which would be the effect of applying local
contributory negligence rules.
Recent uncertainty on the question of the law governing maritime
causes has been prompted by the decision of the Court in Caldarold v.
Eckert.2 7 There, in a suit by a longshoreman against the general agents of
a United States-owned vessel on which he was injured, a state court denied
recovery on the ground that under its law the relation which these agents
bore to the ship did not make them responsible to third persons for its
condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, 5-4.28 A sounder view would
have been that "the liability here, since it arises from a maritime tort, is a
creature of federal law in its entirety, not of state law." " But the case
appears distinguishable if read not as allowing state law to destroy a maritime right of recovery but as holding that a state can determine whether
or not it is able to provide a remedy in its courts on a federally-created
right. Caidarolashould be given a restrictive reading until the Court more
expressly changes its position on the Jensen line of cases, which were left
unconsidered by the majority in Caldaroz.
The refusal to apply the local contributory negligence rules, which
would have cut into the very substance of the maritime right of recovery
in the instant cases, appears to rest securely within the doctrine of uniformity since it is firmly established in the maritime law that contributory
negligence does not bar recovery 30 Indeed, divided damages has been a
characteristic of the corpus juris maris in cases of joint fault.38 To have
24. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922).
25. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).

26. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 344 Pa. 69, 23 A.2d 503 (1942).
27. 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
28. Criticized in Dickinson and Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty, 36 CAMIF.
L. RE€. 169, 193, 219 (1948) and discussed in Stevens, supra note 17, at 261.
29. Justice Rutledge dissenting in Caldarola v. Eckert, supra note 27, at 164.
30. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890)

and cases cited therein; accord,

Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1938). See also, Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Company, 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945).
31. Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 15 (1928). In the Hedger
case, the court made an equal division of damages in accord with the admiralty rule
in collision and property injury cases. In Hazn, damages were apportioned accord-
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applied the local state rules on the basis of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins would
have brought federally-created rights under the general maritime law into
the same confusion which the Erie case sought to remedy in the field of
state-created rights.

Anti-tmtSHERMAN ACT APPLIED TO REFUSAL TO RENEW
PRODUCE MARKET LEASE
Plaintiff fruit and vegetable wholesaler brought suit under the Sherman Act I for an injunction and treble damages when defendant refused
to renew plaintiff's lease to part of its produce building. Defendant corporation sold its stock to local wholesalers and rented sections of the
building to them. The building itself was extremely important, for it
had the most advantageous rail and street facilities in the Providence
area and constituted the habitual congregating point of local retail buyers.
Plaintiff had leased space therein since 1946, but renewal was refused
when due to financial difficulties its stock was transferred to an out-ofstate produce dealer. The district court entered judgment for defendant
on the ground that the exclusion was permissible since competition still
ruled the ultimate market, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that
defendant had a market monopoly under § 2 of the Act and had failed to
come forth with a reasonable business justification for excluding plaintiff.
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3097 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1952).
Language of the Supreme Court indicates that the exclusion of a
competitor from any substantial market is an indication of monopoly and
per se a violation of the Sherman Act.2 One of the recurrent problems
in anti-trust cases, however, has been the amount of commerce which
must be monopolized to constitute a violation of the prohibition of § 2
ing to the degree of fault. Apportionment, rather than equal division of damages
appears to be limited to personal injury cases. Although the Jones Act adopts the
comparative negligence doctrine, its appropriateness in maritime personal injury
cases not brought under that act was expressly left open in The Max Morris, supra.
See Ro BiNSON, ADMnULTY §§ 12, 39 and 115 (1939).
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). Section 2 pertinently provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to -monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
2. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107

(1948):

"...

the use of

monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful." See also Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); International Salt Co., Inc. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (". . . it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market"); Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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of the Act against the monopolization of "any part" of interstate commerce.
The initial interpretation of this phrase gave it a geographical and distributive significances and in its first precise application the Court held
in Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co.4 that a farm advertisement monopoly did not depend on the proportion of ads controlled to the total in the country, but only their proportion to the total in the alleged monopoly's territory. Moreover, practices of cornering the market in a particular commodity have been held
5
invalid although the illegal activities took place only in a localized area.
Today, under the more recent cases, the geographic and distributive considerations as first espoused still apply, but operate within the newly
developed concept of market control as a criterion of monopoly under

§ 2. 6 This approach has been to define an area, product-line or market
fitting the alleged culprit, and then to see whether this product or market
has been monopolized.7 Under this new technique of drawing the line
around the "relevant market", s § 2 has been applied to continually smaller
segments of the economy.9 The major cases have, of course, dealt with
extremely large commercial enterprises such as Alcoa's control of the
United States virgin ingot market,10 and the activities of the primary
United States v. Yellow Cab
United States cigarette manufacturers."
3. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911):
".. the commerce referred to by the words 'any part' construed in the light of
the manifest purpose of the statute has both a geographical and a distributive significance, that is, it incudes any portion of the United States and any one of the
classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign commerce." Accord, Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 619 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) ;
see United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1915),
appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921); cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218 (1947) (unreasonable restraints on interstate commerce are outlawed under
§ 1 of the Act regardless of the amount of commerce affected).
4. 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
5. Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1939) (possession in Chicago of
949o of deliverable corn in United States a violation of § 2 of the Act), accord,
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913) (a comer on cotton in New York a
violation of § 1) ; cf. United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32
(D. Minn. 1945) (a violation of § 2 for sole manufacturer of linen rugs to refuse
to sell to a distributor who underbid manufacturer for a government contract).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Griffith, supra note 2. For an excellent discussion of this development
see Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose, 43 Iuj. L.
Ray. 745 (1949).
7. See Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust
Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. Ra,. 405, 432 (1951).
8. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519-520 (1948) : "The
Sherman Act is not limited to eliminating restraints whose effects cover the entire
United States; we have consistently held that where the relevant competitive
market covers only a small area the Sherman Act may be invoked to prevent unreasonable restraints within that area." (Italics added).
9. Rostow, supra note 6, at 777-8; Smith, supra note 7, at 432-34; Note, 61
YAix L.J. 1010, 1011-2 (1952).
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 6.
11. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra note 6.
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Co., 12 however, reaffirmed the modem applicability of the PrairieFarmer
doctrine in holding that the importance of the interstate commerce (taxicabs) affected in relation to the entire amount of that type of commerce
in the United States is irrelevant. Motion picture affiliates operating in
towns in adjacent states were found to have violated the Sherman Act
when they used their buying power to obtain exclusive privileges from
film distributors.' 3 Even more localized impacts of antitrust on the movie
4
industry were found in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.,'
where Warner Brothers was found to have an illegal monopoly even
though it had only partial control of the downtown Philadelphia movie
exhibition industry, the court defining the relevant market as that city's
centralized theatre district.' 5 A case with similar anti-trust implications,
but more closely allied to the facts of the instant case, is American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal,1 6 in which it was held an antitrust violation for a trade association to refuse to allot selling time to a
local warehouse when allotment was essential to effective participation
in the regional market. But both of the two latter cases, although localized in their immediate impact, are distinct from the instant case in their
inherent nationwide implications-the first dealing with the movie industry, the second with tobacco. In contrast the instant case concerns
a dominant local produce market and the right of its proprietors to refuse
to lease space to a possibly more efficient competitor. Lorain Journal

Co. v. United States' 7 involved similar considerations, for there it was
held that a local newspaper enjoying a monopoly could not exercise its
right to select its customers in order to prevent the establishment of a
competing radio station by refusing advertising space to those purchasing
radio time. A produce market is probably a matter of less national concern than a radio station, but of greater significance as an extension of
the Sherman Act is the finding in the instant case of a violation in a refusal to lease space.' 8 The fact that the lessor was controlled by the
12. 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947). The court also held (at 225) that it is enough
if some "appreciable part" of interstate commerce is the subject of a monopoly. A
more recent case with analogous facts and holding is United States v. National City
Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951).
13. United States v. Griffith, supra note 2; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948). For another example of regional monoply see Montrose
Lumber Co. v. United States, 124 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1941) (tri-state monopoly
by lumber dealer's association).
14. 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945); see also White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State
Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942).
15. 150 F.2d 738, 744: "We are unaware of a rule of limitation, dependent
upon operation in space, which permits an illegal monopoly and restraint of
trade. .

.

.

We know of no authority which sanctions what would otherwise

be an illegal monopoly simply because it operates in a single city or a particular
part of a city and affects only a part of an industry involved."
16. 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950).
17. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
18. Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1911), where
it was held a violation of the Act for railroads owning a terminal to exclude another
railroad.
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plaintiff's competitors is significant, for where the intent to exclude a
competitor is not so apparent the courts may well be reluctant to make
so localized an application of the Act. In this respect the instant case
leaves the way open for a lessor to justify his activities on reasonable
business grounds, 19 and other cases have held the Act inapplicable where
the commerce affected is "de minimis" o or when there is no public

injury.21
The commerce coverage of the Sherman Act has been extended to
intrastate or local activities which "substantially affect" interstate commerce.2 2 When this broad commerce coverage is integrated with the
high degree of localization in the instant case, its future effect on antitrust suits in general, and the treble damage suit in particular, is apparent.23 The combination of the continually diminishing "relevant
market" with the expanded commerce coverage under the Act, including
more purely intrastate activities, means that few economic activities remain beyond the scope of treble damage litigation when they otherwise
2
violate the Sherman Act. '

Anti-trust-RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION
NOT SUBJECT TO STATE ANTI-TRUST LAW
The state of Texas brought an action seeking statutory penalties and

injunctive relief from a violation of the state anti-trust laws.'

The alleged

violation was an agreement whereby Fairbanks-Morse & Co. would persuade various cities to construct municipal power plants and to hire as con19. The court said that reasonable criteria of selecting lessees, such as lack of
space, financial unsoundness or low business or ethical standards, would not violate
the Act, but that defendants had the burden of establishing such justifications.
Instant case at 487. See also American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v.
Neal, supra note 16 (no justification for excluding a competitior that he had lower
building and tax costs; competition is to reduce costs, monopoly perpetuates high
ones) ; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, supra note 17. This is apparently a
§ 2 application of the "rule of reason" as laid down in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, supra note 3, and applied, e.g., in Boro Hall Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
20. Spears Free Clinic and Hospital v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952);
Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86
(7th Cir. 1952) ; Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950).
21. Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Silverman
v. Seifred, 1950-51 TRAnE CASES 162,874 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
22. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948) (Sherman Act held applicable to price rigging in intrastate purchases from
local beet growers; substantial effect test invoked for private plaintiffs; directindirect test scuttled).
23. Rostow, supra note 6, at 777-8; Note, 61 YAM L.J. 1010, 1011-12 (1952).
24. Smith, supra note 7, at 433: "It is apparent that if the area to be studied
is made small enough the sole occupant of that area is automatically found to be
a monopolist thereof. This approach makes it easy to attack almost any one
selected, simply by drawing a small enough boundary around him."
1. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. AiN. arts. 7426, 7428.

554

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

sulting engineer one of two engineers in the conspiracy. The engineer was
to draw the plans for the plant in such a manner that only Fairbanks-Morse
diesels could be used effectively in meeting the specifications. The plans
were to further specify that the successful bidder accept revenue bonds in
lieu of cash payment. Fairbanks-Morse made a mutually exclusive selling
agreement with The Universal Electric Construction Co., which in turn
made a mutually exclusive bond sales agreement with The Ballard-Hassett
Co. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the state's petition.
In affirming the court below, the appellate court held, inter alia, that since
Fairbanks-Morse neither manufactured nor stocked diesels in Texas the
arrangement involved interstate commerce and was thus beyond the state
power. State v. Fairbanks-Morse & Co., 246 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952).
The instant case raises the problem of how far the states may extend
their anti-trust laws to control activities which involve interstate commerce
before they come in conflict with the commerce clause.2 Those activities
which do not admit of a diversity of control are subject to exclusive federal control,8 but others may be regulated by the states 4 until Congress
preempts the field.5 Once Congress acts, however, all inconsistent state
regulations on the subject are thereby abrogated. 6 The applicable sections
of the Texas act 7 are apparently not in conflict with the federal anti-trust
law.8 Therefore, unless the dissolution of the present combination can be
shown to exercise a substantial effect on interstate commerce, there is no
justifiable ground for holding such state action repugnant to the commerce
clause.
It is apparent that the Texas court has unnecessarily limited the scope
of state action permitted by the commerce clause. Since Texas may forbid
the Ford Motor Co. to limit areas in which its retailers may sell,9 and
Massachusetts may forbid the importation of colored oleomargarine,10 it
would seem that Texas may forbid these exclusive sales agreements, when
2. U.S. CowsT. art. I § 8.
3. Southern Pacific R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state cannot regulate
length of through trains); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (state may
not require license to operate interstate bus line). State laws enacted under the
police power which have but an incidental effect on interstate commerce are not
considered regulations of it. Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1938); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
4. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851); Wilson v.

Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U.S. 1829).
5. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., supra note 3.

6. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 146 (1902); Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry.
v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 626 (1898). State laws which are consistent with Congressional acts retain their vitality. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) ; Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942). The conflict must be so direct and positive that the
two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together. Kelley v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937).
7. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 7426, 7428.
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1-40.
9. Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943).
10. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
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they have for their purpose the restraint of intrastate business. It is well
to bear in mind that the state is attempting to break up a conspiracy to restrain trade in construction of municipal power plants, and not to inhibit
interstate trading in diesel engines. The fact that some of the materials
used in the construction of these plants come from without the state should
have no effect on the application of the statute in the instant case." A
holding that the mutually exclusive sales agreements were illegal would
have but an incidental effect on interstate commerce. Fairbanks-Morse
would not be forbidden to sell in Texas, nor would they be forbidden to sell
to the Universal Electric Construction Co., or required to increase or decrease the volume of their sales in Texas. They would simply be required
to cease restraining trade in local power plant construction. Decisions
such as the one in the instant case unnecessarily hamper needed state
action ' 2 in supplementing the federal anti-trust laws, and should not be
followed.

CorporationsDIRECTOR'S RIGHT TO INSPECT CORPORATE
RECORDS DENIED
Relator, a corporate director, brought a mandamus action to compel
defendant to make available to her certain corporate books and records,
relating to marketing practices, sales and customers. Upon a showing by
defendant that an inspection of these records by relator would be injurious
to the corporation,' the writ of mandamus was denied. State ex rel. Paschalil v. Scott, 247 P.2d 543 (Wash. 1952).
The common law right of a director to examine corporate records is
more extensive than that of a stockholder, the latter being denied the right
if the inspection is not for the protection of his interests as a stockholder,
or for the protection of the interests of the corporation.2 The right of a
11. Ewing-Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. C & C Ice Cream Co., 109 F.2d 898

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 600 (1940) (state law held applicable to ice cream
monopoly despite fact that part of raw materials shipped interstate); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 78 N.E. 136 (1906) (conviction for conspiracy
to restrain trade in tobacco shipped interstate affirmed) ; Commonwealth v. McHugh,
326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950) (state law held applicable to conspiracy to
restrain trade in fish shipped interstate).
12. For discussions on the inability of the Federal Government to adequately
handle the entire anti-trust problem see Berge, Some Problems in the Enforcement

of the Anti-Trust Laws, 38 MicH. L. REV. 462 (1940); Hamilton, The Selection
of Cases for Major Investigation, 7 LAw & CoxnmeP. PROB. 75 (1940).
1. It was alleged that relator had a scheme to harass and sabotage the corporation by contacting customers and distributors and making the information available
to competitors.
2. Klien v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 137 Pa. Super. 369, 11 A.2d 770 (1949);
State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 2 Terry 172, 18 A.2d 235 (Del. Super.
1941). Many of the statutes which define the stockholder's right of access are said
to be merely declaratory of the common law. See Albee v. Lamson & H. Corp.,
320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946). But see State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex
Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 Atl. 861 (1913).
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director is normally said to be absolute,3 the rationale being that in order
to perform adequately his corporate duties he must have access to all obtainable information, and protection of the corporate interests requires that
this right be unlimited. 4 The instant decision is based on the theory that
an examination which would be detrimental to the corporation cannot be
in pursuance of those directorial duties and therefore no right to make the
examination exists. 5 In many of the cases in which the courts have characterized this right as absolute," however, they have not been faced with
a situation in which the corporation or some other interest requiring protection would be injured.7 That an extreme situation will justify corporate protection is indicated by Posen v. United Aircraft Products Co.,8 in
which a suspected communist was denied access to corporate records containing secrets vital to the defense program, although there were numerous
holdings in the same jurisdiction to the effect that the right is absolute. 9
In those jurisdictions which have enforced the director's right of inspection despite a showing of potential resultant injury to the corporation,
it is said that the remedy is removal.' 0 While it is quite likely that if the
purpose underlying the director's demand for inspection would justify refusing access to the records it would also justify removal, the latter procedure presents practical difficulties which may make the remedy ineffective.
In closely held corporations, there is a strong possibility that, if cumulative
voting is used, 1 a hostile director might prevent his own removal,' 2 or
3. State ex rel. Dixon v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 3 Terry 423, 36 A.2d
29 (Del. Super. 1944) ; Davis v. Keilson Offset Co., 273 App. Div. 695, 79 N.Y.S.2d
540 (1st Dep't 1948); Machen v. Electrical Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212, 85 Atl. 100
(1912); State ex rel. Altman v. Ice, 75 W. Va. 476, 84 S.E. 181 (1915); Drake
v. Newton Amusement Co., 123 N.J.L. 560, 9 A.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRoaOAIONS § 2235 (1931).
4. See Machen v. Electrical Mfg. Co., supra note 3.
5. For the same argument in a slightly different context, see Heminway v.
Heminway, 58 Conn. 443, 19 At]. 766 (1890).
6. See, e.g., the following cases cited in note 2, supra: Machen v. Electrical
Mfg. Co. (allegation that director neglected his duties and interfered with management of corporation) ; State ex rel. Altman v. Ice (allegation that relator might have
claim against corporation) ; Newton v. Drake Amusement Corp. (director attempting
to force purchase of family holdings); State ex rel. Dixon v. Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co. (relator refused to reveal to fellow directors reason for demanded
examination).
7. A dictum in Straussburger v. Philadelphia Record Co., 335 Pa. 485, 490, 6
A.2d 922, 924 (1939) indicates that when faced with circumstances requiring it
Pennsylvania courts will find the right less than absolute.
8. 111 N.Y.S.2d 261, 201 Misc. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
9. Another New York court, while describing the right as absolute, admitted
in the same breath that there must be exceptions to it. See Melup v. Rubber Corporation of America, 43 N.Y.S.2d 444, 181 Misc. 826 (Sup. Ct. 1943). It should be
noted that both this case and the Posen case were decided by trial courts which
received the evidence first hand.
10. See State ex rel. Wilkens v. Ascher Silk Corp., 207 App. Div. 168, 201
N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1923), affirmed, 237 N.Y. 574, 143 N.E. 748 (1924).
11. This is required by statute in Washington. WASH. REv. CODE §23.32.070
(1952). See also DEL. REv. CODE § 2049 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32 § 157.28
(1934); N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 14.10-15 (1931).
12. In Washington a director may not be removed if the number of votes cast
against his removal would be enough to elect him as a director. WASH. REv. CODE

1953]

RECENT CAISES

.

557

forthwith re-elect himself.x3 In addition, the removal process entails the
necessity of calling a stockholders' meeting1 4 and submitting the corporation to the risk of injury until the removal is effected. This can often be a
far more expensive and cumbersome process than permitting the corporation to refuse access upon a showing that to grant it will result in injury
to the corporation. So long as those who would refuse access to the records have the burden of proving probable injury to the corporation, the
rule advanced in the instant decision seems better suited to protect the
corporation. 15

Criminal LawPRESENCE REQUIREMENT IN EXTRADITION OF ONE
CONVICTED OF NON-SUPPORT
Petitioner was subject to a District of Columbia support order.' when
his wife and two minor children moved to North Carolina. Later, when
in arrears on the support payments, he made a one-day trip to North Carolina. There, upon arrest, he pleaded guilty to a charge of abandonment
and non-support of his wife and minor children in North Carolina. The
court suspended sentence conditioned on continued payment in accordance
with the District of Columbia order. Petitioner returned to the District
of Columbia where he was again arrested and held for extradition because
of failure to make payments. On appeal from a denial of his petition for
habeas corpus, the court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that petitioner
should be released. The court stated that petitioner was not a fugitive
from justice, because he was absent from the demanding state at the time
of the crime, and was not validly charged with a crime, because North
Carolina law requires abandonment to be begun within that state. 2 Fowler
v. Ross, 196 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1952).

§ 23.36.040 (1952).

See also CA.

CoRp. CoDE § 810 (1947); IDAHo CODE ANN.

§30-139 (1943); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §21.13 (1937); MONT. RV. CoDE ANN.

§ 15-408 (1947).
13. In the instant case this probably could not happen since relator owned
only 100 shares of 650 outstanding, and the remaining shares were held by defendant
as trustee for two minors.
14. Ordinarily a director may not be removed by his fellow directors. 2
FLErCHEP, op. cit. spra note 3, § 357.
15. The Washington statute preventing removal of directors, see footnote 11
s-upra, is probably intended to make effective cumulative voting in removal procedures
and not to prevent removal under all circumstances. The decision in the instant
case is in harmony with such a policy.
1. Civil No. 3931-47 D.D.C., March 24, 1948.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. C. 14, § 322 (Supp. 1951). Though the law of the state
is not beyond reasonable dispute, the court has support for its interpretation. For
the substantive crime both abandonment and non-support are necessary, State v.
May, 132 N.C. 1020, 43 S.E. 819 (1903). The duty to support is a continuing
one, State v. Beam, 181 N.C. 597, 107 S.E. 429 (1921), but the element of abandon-
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The requirements for interstate extradition as provided in the United
States Constitutions and federal statutes 4 are that the person who is sought
be charged with a crime and be a fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. People
ex rel. Corkranf5 added the requirement that the accused must be physically present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime. This
requirement is limited by the holding in Strassheim v. Daily 6 that any
material act done within the demanding state as part of a crime subsequently completed in the accused's absence, is sufficient for extradition.
The presence requirement is generally reiterated in cases dealing with
abandonment and non-support.7 However, in many jurisdictions neither
of both continuing elements of this crime need be begun in the demanding
state. The offense can therefore be committed by momentary presence
within its borders. 8 Extradition has been held possible in the case of such
a dual element crime where only the abandonment began within the demanding state and the non-support occurred wholly outside.9 While ordinarily the state of mind with which the alleged fugitive left the state is
unimportant, 10 it has been held that in these cases extradition is only permissible where the petitioner at the time of his departure intended to commit the second element once outside." In light of this authority, if North
Carolina law had been construed to permit abandonment to begin outside
that state, the relator in the instant case would be subject to extradition,
unless the logic of the Strasrsheim case is limited to the situation where the
12
material act in the demanding state occurs before the crime is completed.
ment apparently is not a continuing offense. State v. Hannon, 168 N.C. 215, 83
S.E. 701 (1914). A husband outside the state may commit the crime if his wife is
domiciled within, and also if he is within and she without; State v. Beam, supra,
State v. Hannon, supra. Tending to support the position that either the husband
or the wife must be domiciliary of the state at the time of the first abandonment are
State v. Snead, 197 N.C. 668, 150 S.E. 197 (1929); State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151,
44 S.E.2d 721 (1947).
3. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §2.
4. Ray. STAT. §5278 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (Supp. 1951).
5. 188 U.S. 691 (1903).
6. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
7. E.g., People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E.2d 117
(1939); Drumm v. Pederson, 219 Iowa 642, 259 N.W. 208 (1935). Contra: Ex
parte Gornostayoff, 113 Cal. App. 255, 298 Pac. 55 (1931).
8. People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N.Y. 483, 143 N.E. 653 (1924). The
crime of abandonment in some states may be committed where the defendant has
never been within the prosecuting state, but knowingly lets his non-supported child
stay there. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918). In most states
the one abandoned need never have been within the prosecuting state. E.g., In re
Alexander, 36 A.2d 361 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1944).
9. Keeton v. Gaiser, 331 Mo. 499, 55 S.W.2d 302 (1932); State ex rel. Rinne
v. Gerber, 111 Minn. 132, 126 N.W. 482 (1910); Ex parte Heath, 87 Mont. 370,
287 Pac. 636 (1930). But cf. Ex Porte Roberson, 38 Nev. 326, 149 Pac. 182 (1915).
10. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203
U.S. 222 (1906).
11. Schein v. Gallivan, 321 Mo. 268, 10 S.W.2d 521 (1928) ; State ex rel.
Rinne v. Gerber, supra note 9; cf. Ex parte Roberson, supra note 9.
12. Even with that construction of Strassheim, extradition would be possible
where under state law both elements of the crime were continuing and could be
simultaneously committed during the one day's presence in the state.

1953]

RECENT CASES

State ex rel. Lea v. Brown 18 is the only decision prior to the instant
case concerning the extradition of one convicted in the demanding state
but not present there at the time of the crime. That court permitted the
rendition, but was evenly divided as to whether it was proper because they
could not look behind the conviction at which the accused was present, or
because he had waived his right to contest extradition by voluntarily appearing for trial. The present court limits the earlier case to the waiver
ground. The force of this approach lies in the fact that the extradition
statute speaks of persons charged with crime. 14 Convicted persons, such
as escaped convicts and parole violators, are regarded as still charged with
crime 15 and extradited on the theory that a valid charge does not merge
in an unsatisfied conviction.' 6 On this reasoning there is no rendition if
the original charge was insufficient. Though no decision has rested on
this explicit theory, it would seem that extradition would also be possible
for the crime of jailbreak or parole violation within the demanding state.
But to question the validity of a charge that has resulted in a conviction
would seem to present a question of full faith and credit. 17 The conviction
is of course a nullity if the North Carolina court lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter,' 8 but a mere error in law will not oust the North Carolina
court of jurisdiction,' 9 and where there is genuine uncertainty as to the
correct interpretation of state law the better course would be to leave the
petitioner to his remedy in the courts of the demanding state.20 Moreover,
the petitioner has not appealed his conviction in North Carolina. There
is authority that in extradition he cannot ordinarily contest in a federal
court the validity of his conviction or question by habeas corpus the legality
of prior proceedings in the demanding state until he has exhausted his
remedies in that state. 21 These were largely cases in which a denial of
13. 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. Where there has been no conviction, the court on habeas corpus requires

proof of a substantial charge of crime. This charge need not be a sufficient technical
pleading under the laws of the demanding state. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387,
401 (1908) ; Matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324 (1905).
16. Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980 (6th Cir. 1905). It has also been held
that a parolee who was permitted to leave the state and then violated his parole
outside is still a fugitve from justice. Reed v. Colpoys, 99 F.2d 396, cert. denied,
305 U.S. 598 (1938). Nor does it make any difference that the parole was revoked
when the violator was outside of the state. Ex parte McBride, 101 Cal. App. 251,
281 Pac. 651 (1929).
17. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1. By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1951)
the federal courts are bound by this clause.
18. Cf. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (the concurring opinion
of Justice Frankfurter states, "So long as there is this uncertainty [as to the juris-

diction of a Florida court], we are not justified in finding that New York's judgment was vitiated because of a failure in her duty under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.").
19. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
20. State ex rel. Myers v. Allen, 83 Fla. 655, 92 So. 155 (1922); cf. Reed v.

United States, 224 Fed. 378 (9th Cir. 1915).
21. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd nme., 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
The Supreme Court simply cited Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), leaving un-
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due process in the demanding state had been alleged, rather than the insufficiency of the charge. Unless conviction is regarded as conclusive evidence of the charge, 22 these cases perhaps are to be distinguished from the
23
instant case as only attempts to expand the scope of inquiry in extradition,
though in some circumstances constitutional defects in the procedure lead2
ing to conviction could be sufficient to invalidate the charge of crime. 4
The governor of an asylum state has an effective executive discretion to
refuse rendition for reasons insufficient to release the petitioner on habeas
corpus, 2 5 but that role in the District of Columbia is exercised by the Chief
Judge of the district court.2 6 The grant of the writ by the court of appeals
is properly a judgment of the petitioner's right to discharge.
The result reached in the instant case may be attributable to a general
distaste for extradition in this area. This is understandable in light of
the greater social harm involved in most interstate criminality as compared to this marital misconduct. In addition the court may feel that the
more advisable policy is to require the injured spouse to enforce the support order in the District of Columbia where the proof and witnesses
essential to the defense will be readily available. To these general policy
considerations must be added the extenuating facts in this particular case,
such as the small amount of the delinquency in payments on the support
order ($30), the summary trial without counsel in the demanding state,
and the conviction on a plea of guilty which appeared incorrect under the
local law.
One solution to the problems presented in the present case appears in
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 27 which provides interlocking civil and criminal remedies. The civil procedure provides a
two-state method whereby the injured party makes a complaint to her local
(initiating) court, which takes evidence on the issue of whether a duty
of support exists, 28 and forwards the complaint and evidence to the proper
(respondent) court of the state in which defendant is located. The recertainty as to which states' remedies it referred to. The decision has since been
interpreted to require the exhaustion of the remedies of both the asylum and demanding states, Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
Cf. Johnson
941 (1951); Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951).
v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. Matter of Hope, 7 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 406 (1889); Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68
Conn. 441, 36 Atl. 830 (1896).
23. For possible rationales for this extension, see Horowitz and Steinberg,
Habeas Corpus in Extradition, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 441 (1950) ; Note, 47 CoL L.
REv. 470 (1947).
24. See Comment, 33 CoL L. REv. 1259, 1260 (1933).
25. See Note, 32 CoL L. Ray. 1411, 1419 (1932).
26. D.C. CODE tit. 23, §401 (1940).
27. 9A U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1951).
28. Section 4 authorizes the complainant to invoke either the law of the state
where she initiates the proceedings or the law of the state where she was when the
failure to support commenced.
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spondent court hears the defendant's evidence and then makes its order20
By incorporating certain provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act,30 the support act provides that a defendant who refuses to comply
with a support order can be returned for the crime of non-support regardless of whether he was present within the demanding state or is a fugitive
from justice.31 Thus the support act insures protection of the parties and
provides an efficient means of enforcing support orders, without becoming
entangled in the extradition problems that surround the instant case.

Federal JurisdictionLAW APPLICABLE TO CHAPTER X PLENARY ACTION
BROUGHT IN DISTRICT COURT
The trustee of a Virginia corporation in reorganization under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act 1 brought suit in a federal district court for New
York for acts of fraud and mismanagement committed in 1927 and 1929
by members of the insolvent corporation's board of directors. Jurisdiction was based on § 2 of the act 2 The defendants pleaded a New York
statute of limitation which, if applicable under § 11 (e) of the Act,3 would
have barred the action. The district court held that it was not bound to
apply the state law where its jurisdiction rested on non-diversity grounds,
and instead applied a federal equitable doctrine under which the action
was still timely. 4 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding that
29. Protection of the defendant is provided by requiring that the respondent
court obtain jurisdiction by its usual rules for service and notice. Athough crossexamination is usually not possible, a substitute is available in the respondent
court's discovery procedures permitting the defendant to attack plaintiff's evidence
by depositions and interrogatories. 9A U.L.A., p. 25, §§ 12.3, 12.4 (Supp. 1951).
See Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST. Louis L.J.
12, 20 (1952).
30. 9 U.L.A., p. 169, §§ 5, 6 (1940).
31. People ex rel. Faulds v. Herberich, 301 N.Y. 614, 931 N.E.2d 913 (1950)
(extradition permitted though petitioner had never been within demanding state).
1. 52 STAT. 883-905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§501-676 (1946).
2. 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §11 (1946). This section, which confers
upon the district courts "such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them
to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act," was interpreted in
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947), as a grant of jurisdiction over plenary
actions brought by a Chapter X trustee.
3. 52 STAT. 849 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1946). By this section a trustee
is given two years or "such further period of time as the Federal or State law
may permit," to prosecute in behalf of the estate "any claim against which the period
of limitation fixed by Federal or State law had not expired at the time of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy." The effect of this section depends on what statute
of limitations is applicable; if federal law governs, the trustee's right of action is
subject to it, regardless of the existence of a comparable state statute. See Herget v.
Central National Bank & Trust Co., 324 U.S. 4 (1945).
4. Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), 38 VA. L. Rav. 680
(1952).
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§ 11(e) dictated application of the state statute of limitations where the
suit was based on a state-created right.5 Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d
697 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3175 (U. S. Dec. 23,
1952).
The ultimate question presented is whether the jurisdiction conferred
by § 2 of the Act in furtherance of Chapter X policy is "protective," 0 i.e.,
demands the application of state law by the federal courts in non-diversity
litigation over state-created rights, or instead requires the application of a
uniform federal law. The aspect of protective jurisdiction found in the
application of state law by the federal courts under the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins,7 leads to anomalous results when, as in the instant situation, suit is brought in the district court for a state other than the one in
which the cause of action accrued.8 Under the usual conflict of laws
rule, the statute of limitation of the forum state governs 9 despite the application of the substantive law of the place of the, tort. 10 Since a federal
court is bound under Erie to apply both the statute of limitation of the
state in which it sits 1 and the conflicts rule of that state,' 2 it results that
the enforceability of a cause of action like the one here involved bears no
necessary relation to the law of the state which creates it, but rather is
controlled by the law of the state where the action is brought. The selection of that forum depends upon the availability of service, which itself
bears no necessary relation to the origin of the right. This result, justified
by Erie at least in diversity cases where the crucial relationship is that of
the district court to the courts of the state in which it sits, has apparently
been deemed desirable for general bankruptcy purposes. Thus, § 23 of the
Act,' 8 with exceptions not here important,' 4 provides that jurisdiction of
the federal courts attaches to suits involving a trustee "in the same manner
5. See National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 596, 598 (1949).
6. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SySTE
870 (Temp. ed. 1952). The grant of concurrent jurisdiction over state causes of
action in non-diversity cases is not unique. E.g., National Labor Relations Act
§ 301, 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952 Supp.). It is suggested that it
rests on a policy of granting a federal forum for the determination of state law
questions where they fall within the interstices of comprehensive federal legislation
and one of the parties feels his rights should be determined by a forum directly
charged with effectuating the national scheme.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. In the instant case, the site of the tort was Virginia, the state of incorporation.
RESTAT ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1934).
9. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §603 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 240 (3d ed. 1949).
10. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §378 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAwS 260 (3d ed. 1949).
11. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
12. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
13. 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §46 (1946).
14. As when the defendant assents to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, or
in plenary actions, under §§ 60, 67 and 70 of the Act.
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and to the same extent" as though there were no bankruptcy and the litigation involved the bankrupt. However, since § 23 has been made inapplicable to Chapter X proceedings,15 it would seem that the district courtstate court relationship should not be determinative of the result here.
The alternative to the Erie approach, a uniformity among the district
courts regardless of where they happen to sit, can be achieved either
through application of federal common law creating and governing the
entire cause of action of a Chapter X trustee, or by a uniform federal rule
relating to the enforceability of his actions, the substantive law of which
is that of the state giving rise to them. Federal common law has been
fashioned where the government is a party to either a statutory 16 or nonstatutory 17 action, where private rights under a statute are being litigated,' 8
or where an application of state law would do violence to federal policy
as expressed in federal legislation. 19 Bankruptcy, however, is not an area
where deference to federal uniformity in substantive law has been the rule.
Except where the right involved is federally-created, 20 state law governs as
to the nature and extent of property interests 21 where a district court exercises its plenary jurisdiction under the Act. To apply federal common
law would be justified only to reinforce the scheme of legislation which
the Bankruptcy Act, and more particularly Chapter X, requires. This
would entail the displacement of normally applicable state law. To favor
a Chapter X trustee with a right of action under federal common law
without specific statutory authority seems to require a clearer showing of
congressional intent than the Act presently contains 2 The trustee, however, who has been described as the heart of the comprehensive and sensitive reorganization machinery,23 is specifically charged with investigation
into mismanagement and irregularities in the management of the corporate debtor. 24 This mandate would best be served by governing the enforcement of his actions with a uniform period of limitations, once state
law determines that he has a right of action. Uniformity could be achieved
by adopting the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action
arose, no matter where suit is brought, or by enforcing a federal equitable
bar to state statutes of limitations.
15. Bankruptcy Act § 102, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §502 (1946).
16. E.g., D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
17. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal
commercial paper) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (tort).
18. E.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).

19. E.g., O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940)
(action of libel against company subject to Federal Communications Act).
20. E.g., Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
21. E.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) (title
to real estate); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Reisley, 153 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1945)
(existence of liens).

22. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1947).
23. See Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 HARv. L. RE . 1, 9-10 (1938) ; SEC, REPORT ON PRoTncTIMr AND RORGANiZATON CoImiTms, pt. VIII, 104-110 (1940).
24. Bankruptcy Act § 167(3), 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1946);
cf. §47(a), 52 STAT. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1946) (duties of general bankruptcy
trustee).
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Judgment%COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AS TO ISSUES LITIGATED BY
SOVEREIGN AS REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
The United States brought suit to quiet title to certain shares of stock.
The district court granted the motion of the defendant Dollar for summary
judgment since it was of the opinion that the United States was collaterally
estopped to relitigate the issue of Dollar's title' by virtue of an earlier
action against members of the Maritime Commission. In that suit in
which the members' defense was controlled by the Attorney General's staff,
Dollar's title to the same stock had been established. 2 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that dicta of the Supreme Court during the course of
the previous litigation denied the applicability of collateral estoppel against
the Government.3 United States v. Dollar, 196 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1952).
Private parties who litigate suits to which they are not named parties
have been bound by the decisions as to issues litigated in those suits if
their participation was controlling, 4 and obvious to the opposing party. 5
Were it not for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, this estoppel, which
is designed to prevent needless harassment of litigants and waste of court
time, 6 would also be applied against the Government where it has defended
7
earlier suits against government agents.
Sovereign immunity prevents all suits against the Government without its consent.8 Because of the waiver of this immunity as to suits for
money damages under the Court of Claims 9 and Federal Tort Claims
1. 100 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
2. 188 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
3. Land v. Dollar, 341 U.S. 737, 739 (1951) ; Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736,
739 (1947). These declarations that the judgment would not be res judicata against
the United States are also susceptible to the interpretation that the United States
would be free to bring a subsequent action, though in such an action it would be collaterally estopped by issues litigated in Dollar's suit. See Note, 65 HAv. L. REV.
466, 476 (1952).
4. Souffront v. La Compagnie Des Suceries, 217 U.S. 475 (1910) ; Confectioner's
Machinery & Manufacturing Co. v. Racine Engine & Machinery Co., 163 Fed. 914
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1908). See Hy-lo Unit & Metal Products Co. v. Remote Control
Manufacturing Co., 83 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1936).
5. Bryant Electric Co. v. Marshall, 169 Fed. 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Jefferson Electric Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing
Co., 139 Fed. 385 (C.C.D. Pa. 1905). For a case allowing estoppel even where the
participation was not open, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941).
Ts § 84, comment a (1942).
JuDG
6. See RxsTAT iNr,
7. A private principal defending his agent is subsequently collaterally estopped.
Warford Corp. v. Bryan Screw Mach. Products Co., 44 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1930);
Castle v. Noyes, 14 N.Y. 329 (1856).
8. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
506, 512 (1940); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); see Block,
Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 1060 (1946).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1952).
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Acts, 10 sovereign immunity is now primarily an obstacle to suits for the return of property." Such suits were formerly permitted against an agent of
the Government who acted unconstitutionally, 1 2 beyond the scope of his authority,13 or tortiously. 14 But the recent decision in Larson v. Domestic and
Foreign Commerce Co., by explaining all such suits correctly decided as
instances of the first two categories of cases, has apparently eliminated the
suit for tortious action.' 5 Therefore a judgment for the return of property to a private party (which is ordinarily the only outcome which leaves
the Government reason to relitigate) necessarily involves a determination
that the Government through its agent was acting where Congress did not
intend that it should,16 or where it may not constitutionally.
Though the bar of sovereign immunity was originally met by denominating the suit as one against the agent in his personal capacity,' 7 it is
fair to say that in all but exceptional cases governmental action is in fact
in issue, for the personal basis of the suit is an obvious fiction.' 8 The
Government can act only through agents, and the agent is sued only because of his official position. His successor in office can freely be substituted as defendant. 19 As a practical matter the Government will defend
the suit, and by an adverse decision will lose control of the property in
question unless it relitigates. Application of collateral estoppel in recognition of the Government's interest in the suit against the agent would protect the private party injured by unauthorized or unconstitutional action
from being forced to match the Government's vast resources in continued
litigation.20 Faced with this question, the Supreme Court originally de10. 28 U.S.C. §2671 et seq. (Supp. 1952).

Section 2680(a) prevents suits

against the Government for damages arising from discretionary conduct of an employee.
11. Suit against the Government is ordinarily possible where the Government
takes property without adequate compensation. 40 STAT. 911 (1918), 33 U.S.C.
§ 594 (1946); see Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). But cf. Youngstown
Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But to obtain specific property
rather than money damages the suit must be brought against the agent.
12. See, e.g., Richert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1935); Sterling
v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
13. See, e.g., Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925); Santa Fe Pacific Ry. v.
Fall, 259 U.S. 197 (1922).
14. See, e.g., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.

196 (1880).

15. 337 U.S. 682, 698 (1949). The suit in Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947),
had been permitted as either tortious action or unauthorized action. See Note, 65
HAxv. L. REv. 466, 472 (1952).
16. A suit may be imagined where the agent in question had no authority, but
some other government agent had. In such a case even if collateral estoppel were
applied against the Government, it would not prejudice subsequent Government
action through the authorized agent.
17. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
18. See Block, supra note 8 at 1079.
19. Fmn. R. Crv. P. 25(d).
20. Since the Government is ordinarily willing to let the suit against the agent
settle the matter, its arbitrary refusal to do so in a particular case if not always
an abuse of power is certainly subject to abuse.
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cided against collateral estoppel. 21 Later the Court stated that where the
Government has a "laboring oar" in the controversy it has no greater
rights than any other party. 22 But the language held to control the instant case is a return to their earlier view.2
It is preferable to allow suit against a governmental agent on the
premise that the Government will not be bound thereby rather than completely foreclose so important a remedy as the suit against the agent.24
Yet the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be held to require such
an alternative. The prevention of undue interference with governmental
operations is today the principal basis of the doctrine.2 5 Substantial protection is already afforded by the immunity of both the agent and the Government from suit where a high executive officer acts tortiously within
the scope of his authority.26 But where there is a valid claim of unconstitutional or unauthorized action, since this is precisely the area in which
it is not desirable to promote freedom of governmental action, the dictates
of sovereign immunity should be subordinated to the protection of private
interests through a suit against the offending agent, which as to issues
litigated will bind the Government. With that course rejected by the instant case, an act to permit suits for the return of property in the Court of
Claims is necessary to accomplish the same ends.

LaborEXCEPTION TO EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN WITH
CERTIFIED UNION REPUDIATED BY EMPLOYEES
The International Association of Machinists was certified on May 25,
1949, as the bargaining representative of respondent's production, maintenance and shipping employees. Contract negotiations were opened and
continued during the succeeding eleven months until May 4, 1950. At that
time respondent refused to bargain further with the union on the ground
21.
98 U.S.
22.
23.

United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Carr v. United States,
433 (1878).
Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945).
Supra note 3.

24. The refusal to permit suit where the Government is an indispensable party,
or admittedly claimed title to the property in question, e.g., Mine Safety Appliance
Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382
(1939), shows the possibility that a decision holding the Government bound would
thereafter block suits against governmental agents.
25. See Block, supr note 8, at 1063.
26. Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950) (and cases cited
therein) ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949). Because of the discretionary conduct exception to the Tort Claims Act, supra note 10, it is probable that
no suit against the Government for money damages is possible either. The Larson
case, note 15 supra, will prevent any suit against the agent acting tortiously within
his constitutionally granted authority, but it does not prevent a suit for damages
against the Government where otherwise permissible under the Tort Claims Act.
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that a decertification petition signed by all of respondent's employees had
been filed on May 1, 1950, with the NLRB, and the employees had requested respondent not to enter into any agreement with the union until
the Board had acted on their petition. The union filed a complaint with
the Board charging that the respondent's refusal to bargain for the full
certification year was an unfair labor practice. After a hearing the Board
so found, and ordered the respondent to cease and desist from refusing to
bargain with the union.' On petition the court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order on the grounds that the administrative "one
year rule" was an arbitrary provision and that applying it under the facts
of this case would deprive the employees of the right to be represented by a
union of their own choosing. NLRB v. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co.,
199 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1952).
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 specified neither the minimum duration of a union's certification as exclusive bargaining representa-2
tive nor the employers' duty to bargain during the period of certification.
The NLRB, however, administratively constructed a certification bar of
one year to further representation proceedings, 8 and determined that an
employer was obligated to bargain with a certified union for a reasonable
period of time which in the absence of unusual circumstances was customarily held to be one year.4 The rulings were uniformly upheld by the
courts.6 The purpose of the rule was to resolve two divergent aims in the
national labor policy: the desire to allow employees to be represented by
unions of their own choice and the need for stability in bargaining relationships.6 In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Amendment added to the Act § 9(c) (3),
providing that "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held." 7 This provision was interpreted by the
Board as impliedly codifying the one-year rule to require that employers
bargain with a certified union for at least one year in the absence of unusual circumstances.8
There is language in the instant decision to the effect that this case
should fall within the "unusual circumstances" clause of the Board's one1. The Board did not specify the length of time re-opened negotiations were
to continue. See text at notes 15, 16 infra.
2. See NLRB v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 140 F.2d 217, 222 (4th Cir.
1944). For a comparison of § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act before and
after the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, see 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HisTORy OF THE
LAwOR MANAGEMENT RLATIONS Acr 1661, 1669 (1948).
3. Matter of New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 51 (1938).

4. Lift Trucks Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 998, 999 (1948).
5. E.g., Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
6. See Cushman, The Duration of Certifications by the National Labor Relations Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 MicH. L. Rxv. 1

(1946).
7. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (Supp. 1952). See Pepper
and Potter Inc. v. Auto Workers, 29 LAE. REL REF. MAN. 2580 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
8. The Mengel Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 705 (1948).
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year rule.9 This would represent a new application of the clause. It has
been uniformly held that the union must be recognized even where it has
lost its majority through no fault of the employer. 10 In the few cases where
the Board has found unusual circumstances, the question was not lack of
employee support but the continued existence of the certified representative, as where an employees' association dissolved and affiliated with another union 1 or where a local union disaffiliated with the CIO and affiliated with the AFL.J In these instances, allowing the employer to cease
bargaining short of the one-year period does not impair the objective of
stability since the certified agent no longer exists. However, to allow the
employer to stop bargaining in the instant case does endanger stability
even though the union has been unanimously repudiated. The instant case
will not be readily distinguishable from cases where the fact situations
differ only in degree from unanimity to a simple majority.
The court also reasoned that a fixed perod for the duration of the
employer's duty to bargain would be arbitrary. Because the union was
repudiated unanimously by the employees, and with no inducement from
the employer, the court felt that a strict one-year rule would undermine
the employees' freedom to choose their own bargaining representative.' 3
The court's stand was motivated by at least two difficulties involved in the
one year rule. First, if negotiations are continued and an agreement is
reached it will bind the employees and bar a claim of representation during
its term.14 The union, knowing it has been repudiated, will feel a strong
compulsion to execute an agreement on the employer's terms in order to
maintain its status by taking advantage of this contract bar. Second, there
is the problem of how long negotiations once re-opened should continue.
Litigation of this type is extremely lengthy 15 and changes in industrial
conditions during the period of litigation may require that the re-opened
negotiations be extended beyond the remaining portion of the original oneyear period in order to give the union a fair opportunity to negotiate an
agreement. In the instant case the Board's cease and desist order gives
evidence of the fact that such an extended period would be required. 16
Although it seems eminently fair to extend the certification year where loss
9. Instant case at 69.
10. E.g., NLRB v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 140 F.2d 217 (4th Cir.
1944); NLRB v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 714 (1944).
11. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944).
12. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946).
13. Instant case at 70.
14. De Vry Corporation, 73 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1947) (collective bargaining agreement executed within one year period is effective bar during its term to a claim
of representation).
See discussion in The Mengel Company, 80 N.L.R.B. 705,

720 (1948).
tion.

15. In the instant case over two years had elapsed since the beginning of litiga-

16. See Appendix to Petitioner's Brief at 225a (Part (b) of Board's order requires posting of notice for sixty days).
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of union support is due to unfair labor practices on the part of the employer,' 7 where this factor is not present it is at least arguable that an extension would impose an unwarranted penalty on the employer and employee.
However, despite these two difficulties, the need for union security
has been the predominant factor in previous Board 18 and court 19 determinations and was the motivating concern behind the adoption of
§ 9(c) (3).20 The one-year rule lessens the danger of the employer stalling in order to place the union in an unfavorable light, prevents harassment
of the elected union by other unions seeking certification, thus impeding
bargaining while the union seeks to protect its position vis a vis the employees, and provides the employer and the union with a period of repose
in which to work out an agreement.
Therefore, although the result would be admittedly harsh in the
instant case, there is much to support the view that collective bargaining
generally will profit by strict application of the one-year rule. It has
been advanced that union-employee relations should operate on the basis
of common law agency.2 1

The better analogy is that the union should

be considered as akin to an elected public official. Employees should
22
choose judiciously in the first instance and then stand by their choice.
17. See NLRB v. Gatke Corp., 162 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1947) (company refused to
bargain in good faith during period); Kress & Co., 29 LAB. REiL REF'. MAN. 2504
(6th Cir. 1952) (employer caused procedural delays).
18. Beldon Brick Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 465, 473 (1949); Lift Trucks Inc., 75
N.L.R.B. 998, 1007 (1948).
See discussion in The Mengel Company, 80 N.L.R.B.
705, 719 (1948).
19. E.g., NLRB v. Geraldine Novelty Co.; 173 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1949); NLRB
v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corp., 170 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1948). But cf. Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
20. Senator Taft stated in debate that "The bill also provides that elections
shall be held only once a year, so that there shall not be a constant stirring up of
excitement by continual elections. The men choose a bargaining agent for one year.
He remains the bargaining agent until the end of that year." 93 CONG. R.
The pro3838 (1947); See SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947).
visions of § 9(c) (3) are not in conflict with the general tenor of the Taft-Hartley
Act which was to improve the unequal position of the employer and employee under
the Wagner Act. Rather it was felt that union security in this area would promote
the best interests of employer and employee.
21. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
22. See Cushman, The Duration of Certification.s by the National Labor Relations Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 MicH. L. REv. 1,
6 (1946).

